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I. Introduction
As a subject of extensive scholarship and a potent political buzzword,
globalization is a deeply polarizing concept that inspires conflicting views about its
effects. In the United States, popular debate often describes globalization as having
uniformly positive or negative impacts on the country’s economic health. This line of
reasoning is employed particularly with respect to shifts in the labor market and its
implications on Americans’ economic prosperity. This reasoning, however, is not a
theoretically sound or an empirically useful way to describe and understand the
economic impact of globalization, for it implies that a complex, multifaceted
phenomenon produces uniform results (whether positive or negative) and neglects
consideration of factors that mediate the impact of globalization. This binary
approach, moreover, leads to highly simplified explanations of the current social,
economic and political divisions in the United States.
To address these problems, this thesis first reframes the conventional binary
approach to globalization to argue that the impact of globalization is mediated by the
variations in the economic contexts of American states. To validate my revised
approach, I present and analyze data on the impact of globalization with respect to the
inward foreign-direct investment (FDI) on employment Colorado, Georgia, Ohio, and
Texas. I then elaborate on the implications of this analysis by discussing how it helps
a more nuanced understanding of the current political and economic discontent in the
United States.
The thesis is divided into 5 sections. In section 1, I critique the theoretical
underpinnings of the popular debate surrounding the effects of globalization, and
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propose an alternative theory. In section 2, I describe the data used to advance my
argument and outline the methodology I applied to gauge the impact of globalization
on the four states examined in the thesis. Section 3 contains my data analysis, where I
describe the sectoral employment profile of each of the four states, then discuss the
significance of foreign direct investment with respect to employment across 7 key
economic sectors across the four states, placing heavy emphasis on the manufacturing
sector. In section 4, I discuss at length the broader implications of the data, illustrating
how the varied impact of foreign direct investment can explain much of the current
political and economic discontent in the United States. Section 5 briefly summarizes
the key findings from the data and its broader implications.
II. Theory
In his book Globalization and Its Discontents Revisited: Globalization in the
Era of Trump, Joseph Stiglitz notes that “honest academics have always pointed out
that there would be winners and losers in globalization” (Stigliz 2017). Indeed,
globalization scholarship thoroughly acknowledges the “uneven, differential, and
dynamic” effects of globalization and its associated processes (Gumez 2017). In his
seminal work The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Thomas Friedman advances the argument
that globalization produces “lions” at the apex of the global economic order that prey
upon “wounded gazelles,” who lack the resources to keep pace with shifts in the global
economy (Friedman 1999). He further categorizes globalization’s “losers” in
distinguishing two groups he refers to as “Turtles” and “Used-to-Be’s”; the former is
composed of the world’s poorest in developing countries, while the latter are formerly
economically stable, downwardly-mobile individuals with the means for political
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organization (Friedman 1999). Joseph Stiglitz discusses the same phenomenon on a
global scale by stressing the role of economic liberalization as managed by global
financial institutions in deepening inequality between developed and developing
countries (Stiglitz 2001).
Popular debate on globalization, however, does not always acknowledge the
variable effects of globalization, and instead reduces a complex phenomenon to a
single outcome that is either “positive” or “negative” with respect to economic
prosperity. This linear explanation of globalization is not theoretically sound and is
unhelpful in understanding the impact of globalization in the United States. This line
of popular reasoning is depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1 Goes Here
In the United States, many of the predominant narratives on the impact
of globalization on the US economy are consistent with this flawed line of reasoning.
Many who subscribe to the belief of uniformly negative outcomes emphasize
widespread job loss and labor outsourcing, as well as the decline of traditional bluecollar industry as a result of increased foreign competition, among other economic and
social ills. Those favoring positive outcomes of globalization cite job growth in skilled
field such as Informational Technology (IT) or the United States capacity to attract
foreign talent that enhances our innovative capacity. Such arguments, however, are
theoretically flawed.
The theoretical problem arising from the assertion that globalization produces
uniformly positive or negative effects is twofold. First, “positive” or “negative”
arguments are value judgements that cannot be tested with empirical evidence.
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Second, it is not logical that a complex and multidimensional phenomenon would
produce a uniformly “positive” or “negative” outcome without some form of
mediating influence, as illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2 Goes Here
The inclusion of a mediating factor improves theoretical foundation for
understanding the effects of globalization. However, it still neglects to identify the
factors that mediate the impact of globalization in a nuanced way beyond the unhelpful
binary view of “positive” and “negative.” My theory thus reframes and improves
upon this binary view, by arguing that the impact of globalization is mediated by
contextual factors and results in different outcomes depending upon these factors.
More specifically, I propose that the impact of globalization is mediated by economic
context.
In the case of the United States, specifically, a better way to test the
purportedly uniform effects of globalization is to examine its impact in relation to the
differing economic contexts of individual American states. I focus on four states:
Colorado, Georgia, Ohio, and Texas. I expect that the different economic contexts of
each of these states will mediate the impact of globalization. This theoretical
proposition is depicted in Figure 3.
Figure 3 Goes Here
As a preliminary indication of my theoretical argument, my analysis will show
that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as a measure of globalization supports 20.87% of
Colorado’s manufacturing sector employment. By contrast, FDI supports 60.04% of
Ohio’s manufacturing sector employment supported by FDI. This marked disparity is
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attributable to the fact that, unlike Colorado, Ohio has historically possessed a robust
manufacturing sector in America’s industrial heartland.
The next section discusses the data and methodology used to gauge the impact
of globalization on the four states used in my analysis.
III. Data and Methodology
While there are many ways to conceptualize and examine the processes of
globalization, this thesis focuses on the economic dimension of globalization.
Specifically, it examines the impact of economic globalization on individual American
states through sectoral analysis of employment in select industries across four states:
Colorado, Georgia, Ohio, and Texas. It uses Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as a
measure of economic globalization. Foreign Direct Investment is a simple and
practical indicator of globalization because it represents the degree of international
involvement in supporting the respective workforces and economic sectors of each of
the four states. The thesis uses the structure of the workforce in economic sectors to
measure employment in each of the four states. The impact of FDI on employment in
different economic sectors is a particularly useful way to measure the impact of
globalization for two reasons. First, it illustrates the composition of the job market
and the relative importance of each sector for a state’s economy. Second, it highlights
the potential for workers to earn a living, which carries greater implications for
Americans’ economic security and wellbeing. Foreign Direct Investment and
workforce structure facilitate uniform comparisons of otherwise diverse American
states.
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All data pertaining to economic sectors are drawn from and organized according to
the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS). The NAICS is used
for data collection across all federal bodies collecting employment statistics, making it
the ideal for organizing the data for the thesis. The NAICS categorizes sectors and
subsectors at multiple levels of aggregation; I limit my analysis to the highest level of
aggregation in order to locate uniformly measured figures for both domestic
employment and FDI-supported employment, as detailed sector data was not available.
The eight sectors included in the analysis were identified as the largest recipients of
FDI in the states examined. Thus, the scope of my analysis includes the following
sectors: Finance and Insurance; Information; Professional and Scientific Services; Real
Estate; Retail; Manufacturing; and Wholesale Trade. I also include an “Other”
category, which encompasses all of the remaining nonagricultural NAICS sectors.
The source for the sector-specific employment data is the Bureau of Labor
Statistics’ Occupational Employment Statistics Program (OES). The OES publishes
annual research estimate reports organized by NAICS sector. All domestic data were
located within the OES research estimate archives. The source for the FDI-supported
employment data is SelectUSA, a division of the United States Department of
Commerce that promotes inward FDI flow. Using their Investment Data Tool, I
located FDI employment data for each state and sector. Because OES Research
Estimates are not available prior to the year 2012, and SelectUSA FDI data are not yet
available for 2016 through 2018, I limit the scope of my analysis to the year 2015.
While more recent data are available with respect to domestic employment, limiting
my analysis to the year 2015 enables me to avoid the gaps in the FDI data and conduct
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uniform comparisons of domestic and FDI-supported employment data. Employment
data for the year 2015 retains sufficient predictive power as the general trends
observed within that time period have continued into future years. The total number of
employees in each state’s workforce was located using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’
Economy at a Glance data tool.
The data used in this analysis begins with a sectoral breakdown of domestic
employment in seven major industries for Colorado, Georgia, Ohio, and Texas. This
includes the number and percentage of employees in each sector. I then present the
percentage of each state’s total workforce attributable to FDI. Finally, I present the
number of FDI-supported employees and percentage of each sector’s workforce
supported by FDI in relation to total employment in each sector. The next section
presents the data analysis.
IV. Data Analysis
Appendix 1 at the end of the document presents the full dataset for the analysis
presented in this thesis. Table 1 reports data on the workforce profile of each of the
four states examined in this thesis: Colorado, Georgia, Ohio, and Texas. It provides a
baseline mapping of the total workforce and its breakdown by relevant economic
sectors. The data show the number of employees in a given economic sector and the
percentage of the state’s total workforce represented by that sector. Because the
baseline employment data is sourced from the BLS Occupational Employment
Statistics Program, which encompasses all NAICS sectors, those represented in the
table are identical to those highlighted by SelectUSA for attracting the largest share of
foreign direct investment. The total and sectoral composition of the workforce in
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Table 1 thus allows for optimal comparability between total employment figures and
FDI-supported employment figures.
Table 1 Goes Here
Immediately apparent in the sectoral breakdown of the workforce is that the
vast majority of each state’s employment is represented within the “Other” category,
which houses an average of 64.27% of the states’ labor force. This category
encompasses the remaining nonagricultural NAICS sectors not identified by
SelectUSA as significant recipients of FDI. For this reason, they are not the focus of
this analysis.
In Colorado, the Profession, Scientific, and Technical Services sector, which
employs 7.74% of the state’s workforce, trails the Retail sector, which employs 9.68%
of the state’s workforce. However, Professional and Services sector is also the sector
with a high concentration of workers in what are generally considered knowledgebased jobs; when combined with the share of the state’s workforce in the knowledgebased Finance and Insurance sectors (3.86%) and the knowledge-based journalism,
broadcasting and telecommunications-based Information sector (2.56%), the overall
share of the Colorado’s workforce in the post-modern technological and information
based sectors of the state’s economy is 13.86%. Comparison with the other states
shows that Colorado’s 13.86% share of the workforce in the knowledge-based sectors
exceed those of Georgia (11.84%), Ohio (9.84%), and Texas (9.84%) in the
corresponding knowledge-based sectors.
In Ohio, the largest share of the state’s workforce is in manufacturing at
12.68%, attesting to Ohio’s position as a historical manufacturing hub in America’s
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industrial heartland. Notably, Ohio also has the lowest employment share in
knowledge-based sectors (9.84%) of the four states, as noted above. While the Retail
sector attracts the largest share of the workforce in both Georgia (10.70%) and
(10.37%), the manufacturing sector in both states attracts the second largest share of
the workforce at 8.33% and 7.15%, respectively. However, this is not comparable to
the historical economic significance of the manufacturing sector in Ohio. Instead, the
emergence of the manufacturing sectors in Georgia and Texas are attributable to more
recent economic shifts associated with globalization, as I will elaborate upon below.
As summary indicators of economic structure, these data show notable
differences in the economic composition between the four states. If my theoretical
proposition that the impact of FDI is mediated by these economic differences is valid,
then the impact of inward foreign direct investment should have varied impacts on
employment in these sectors across the four states. I will now discuss the contribution
of FDI to the total workforce of each of the four states. Figure 4 displays the data for
this discussion.
Figure 4 Goes Here
Figure 4 illustrates the extent to which FDI-supported employment contributes
to each state’s total workforce. In Colorado, FDI contributes 103,000 jobs (3.79%) to
the total workforce of 2,715,76. In Georgia, FDI-supported employment is slightly
greater, with 222,220 jobs for its workforce of approximately 4,504,229 (5%). In
Texas, FDI-supported employment is roughly comparable to Georgia’s at 4.61%, with
586,000 FDI-sourced jobs out of a total of workforce of 12,496,106. Finally, Ohio
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with 526,600 FDI-supported jobs in its workforce of 5,416,220 has the largest share of
FDI-supported employment at 9.72% of total employment.
A cursory examination of these figures might suggest that, in contributing a
relatively small percentage to each of the four states’ total workforce, FDI-supported
employment is of little consequence in producing the hypothesized varied economic
globalization outcomes. However, a closer look at the FDI contribution to state
employment by economic sectors indicates more complex and nuanced results due to
the varied economic contexts of each state.
The data in Table 2 help to illustrate this mediating role of varied economic
contexts on the contribution of FDI to employment in the four states. I will provide an
aggregate overview of the contribution of FDI to employment in individual economic
sectors in Colorado, Georgia, Ohio, and Texas. I will then discuss in greater detail the
contribution of FDI to the respective manufacturing sectors of these four states. While
the significance of other sectors is not to be understated, both the theoretical literature
and recent quantitative research suggest that the long-term vitality of manufacturing
sector is of great consequence to the overall economic health of the United States
(Muro et al. 2015). Moreover, the manufacturing sector is directly enmeshed with the
core impending challenges facing the United States as a direct result of globalization,
such as increasing skill requirements that displace traditional blue-collar laborers,
increased international competition in historically prosperous industries, and
accelerating rural-urban migration.
Table 2 Goes Here
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A close examination of the data in Table 2 reveals meaningful variations
among sectors and among the four states. Comprised of sectors identified by
SelectUSA as having the largest concentration of FDI-supported employment, the data
show the number of employees in FDI-supported jobs in a given sector, the percentage
of each sector’s total employment attributable to FDI-supported jobs, and the
combined total of domestic and FDI-supported employees in each sector for the four
states examined.
Overall, the substantial impact of FDI-supported employment in the
manufacturing sector cannot be overstated in assessing globalization outcomes. Of the
four states examined, it is the only sector that appears within the top two sectors by
percentage of FDI employment (see Table 2). Notably, it is also the sector with the
most FDI employment by percentage in all four states, with margins between
manufacturing and the next highest sector by FDI employment as high as 8.9% in
Colorado and 51.68% in Ohio.
Perhaps the most notable insight these data provide is the stark contrast
between the significance of the FDI contribution to a given sector in a state’s
workforce and the perceived significance of FDI-supported employment when looking
at the total percentage of FDI contribution to a state’s total workforce; this
phenomenon is most prominently represented in the case of manufacturing. For
example, while only 3.79% of Colorado’s total workforce is attributable to FDIsupported employment, (See Figure 4) more than 20% of Colorado’s manufacturing
sector employees are FDI-supported (See Table 2). Colorado, historically, has not had
a robust manufacturing sector; that more than one-fifth of employment in its
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manufacturing sector is attributable to FDI speaks to the scholarly consensus that
globalization will have a substantial impact on the United States labor force through
economic restructuring (Friedman 1999; Stiglitz 2017). Colorado exemplifies this
phenomenon in that a sector of relatively small historical significance to the state
economy now manifests a significant economic footprint in the state economy through
FDI.
The economic activity of nascent industries occurring in Colorado is also
visible in other states. The FDI-supported faction of the manufacturing sectors in
Georgia and Texas are near-identical to that of Colorado, consisting of 20.85% and
20.23% FDI-supported employees, respectively. Like Colorado, these figures
represent a fundamental change in economic structure, where “new economies” have
developed with significant support from FDI.
By comparison, Ohio has a markedly-higher share of FDI-supported
employment in manufacturing than Colorado, Georgia, and Texas. With 412,300 FDIsupported jobs in its manufacturing sector of 686,600 workers, over 60% of the state’s
manufacturing jobs are FDI-supported. This amounts to 7.61% of Ohio’s total labor
force being supported by FDI, compared to only 1.06% in Colorado, 1.74% in
Georgia, and 1.45% in Texas. What differentiates Ohio from the other states examined
is its historically strong manufacturing sector; the total percentage of the labor force in
its manufacturing section as displayed in Table 1 reflects its greater significance to the
state economy, overall. The greater contribution of FDI to manufacturing employment
compared to that of Colorado, Georgia, and Texas can thus be attributed to differences
in economic context. More specifically, the share of employment in manufacturing
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attributable to FDI reflects the historical size and significance of the manufacturing
sector in Ohio, thereby illustrating my central theoretical claim that the impact of
globalization is mediated by economic context. In this case, the same process of
globalization, measured by inward foreign direct investment, has produced vastly
different contributions to employment because of the different economic contexts of
the four states.
The central lesson to be drawn from the systematic data analysis presented in
this section is that the differences in FDI employment contribution to the four states’
economic structure produce correspondingly varied outcomes for different segments of
the American population, resulting in the marked economic differences and sharp
political divisions across multiple fronts. I elaborate on these larger social, economic
and political implications of my data analysis in the next section.
V. Implications
As the data analysis in the previous section shows, while the FDI contribution
to a state’s total economy may appear to be small, the FDI contribution to employment
in individual sectors is far from inconsequential. This impact is especially evident in
the manufacturing sector, where over 20% of employees are supported by FDI in all
four of the states examined. As a representative indicator of the larger phenomenon of
shifting economic composition, the implications of FDI-supported employment in
manufacturing are far-reaching. Specifically, the varied impact of FDI on the
manufacturing sector linked to economic differences among American states help
explain the current economic and political discontent in the United States. This
contingent effect further supports my theoretical proposition that, rather than
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producing uniformly “positive” or “negative” outcomes, the impact of globalization is
moderated by the specific economic contexts of American states.
At the epicenter of the events triggered by the interplay between the forces of
globalization and the American manufacturing sector is the election of President
Donald Trump in 2016. While socially-fashionable explanations for the election
results centers upon the importance of racism and xenophobia in the public sphere,
there is an underlying, less often explored economic explanation that begins with
fundamental change in traditionally blue-collar industries such as manufacturing.
Historically, the manufacturing sector has existed at the heart of American
economic prosperity and growth, with manufacturing jobs supporting a robust middle
class. Presently, it remains a vitally important source of employment for “unskilled”
workers without a bachelor’s degree (Scott 2015). However, increased foreign
competition and the advancement of technology has changed the nature of American
manufacturing, gradually driving the jobs of the same less-educated workers into
obsolescence. As one report notes, “globalization and technological change are
increasing the education requirements of the sector, sharpening its skills challenge”
and making it increasingly difficult for employers to find qualified workers (Muro et
al. 2015; Muro, Kulkarni, and Hart 2016). In effect, these changes have produced a
growing class of Americans referred to by Friedman as “Used-to-Be’s,” who have
been ousted from their secure middle-class existence and forced to watch their social
safety net shrink away (Friedman 1999). This dwindling economic security of
America’s “Used-to-“Be’s” continues to advance as the United States transitions to a
“knowledge economy” that favors white collar professions and college-educated
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workers, creating a fundamental tension between the “winners and losers” of
globalization along class lines.
These globalization-induced structural economic changes also account for the
political conflict between globalization’s “winners and losers.” One such example is
the political cleavage between what has been dubbed “high output America” and “low
output America” (Muro and Liu 2016; Tankersley 2016). According to the article,
“two different economic nations within America” are characterized by fundamental
differences in voting behavior. In the aftermath of the 2016 election, he observed that
the less than 500 Clinton-majority counties altogether encompassed 64% of economic
activity as measured by output, while the more than 2,600 Trump-majority counties
encompassed on 36% of economic activity. This same trend was echoed in the 2018
midterm elections, where Muro noted that the governing majority won by Democrats
encompassed more than 60% of America’s economic activity, while the Republican
seats accounted for less than 40% of economic activity. Further, he observed that seats
won by Democrats represented a disproportionately greater share of Americans with a
bachelor’s degree or greater working in “knowledge professions” such as software
publishing and computer systems design, while Republican seats were backed by a
workforce dominated by non-advanced, low-output manufacturing subsectors (Muro
and Whiton 2018). These observations serve to represent the empirical reality
explained by the theoretical premise that globalization produces a variety of outcomes
depending upon economic context.
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This particular divide between “America’s two economies” poses a salient
challenge for legislators, as these two groups have inherently conflicting policy
interests:
“…a rurally oriented Senate majority representing ‘traditional’
agricultural, energy, and production economies stands ready to block efforts to
address the needs of an urban and suburban ‘knowledge’ economy. That latter
economy is more oriented to future-leaning digital services, and thus depends
on solutions to major issues like R&D funding, worker reskilling for a digital
age, immigration, health care, income inequality, and international
cooperation” (Muro and Whiton 2018).
The central concern arising from this conflict, according to Muro, is that it
affords non-urban Republicans disproportionate power to enact policy that “fails to
meet the needs of the core, high-value economic sector of the country (Muro and
Whiton 2018). This observation, noteworthy by itself, carries an underlying
implication that America’s most important economic activity is concentrated in the
same sort of Clinton-majority, urban areas saturated with knowledge-based
professions. Concurrently, however, it is still widely-reported that manufacturing is the
largest and most important sector in the American economy by many metrics,
including employment and total share of GDP (Scott 2015). This raises the question as
to how a purportedly-decaying manufacturing , sector can simultaneously be
considered of vital importance to the country’s economic prosperity (Scott 2015). The
nexus between these two realities emerges from yet another consequence of
globalization, namely, the development of advanced industry (AI).
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Within the manufacturing sector, there is a widening gap between the lowoutput manufacturing subindustries implicated in Muro and Tankersley’s analyses –
such as paper, apparel, and food – and high output “advanced” manufacturing,
including products like chemicals, computer equipment, and motor vehicle parts. What
separates these subindustries, according to a Brookings report, is that the latter
“invest[s] heavily in technology innovation and employ[s] skilled workers to develop,
diffuse, and apply new productivity-enhancing technologies” (Muro et al. 2015).
Those employed in advanced manufacturing earn, on average, more than those in
traditional low-output manufacturing; this is notable in that more than half of all
advanced industry employees possess less than a bachelor’s degree, making it a
significant employer of the same demographic groups who can no longer retain
economic stability in traditional, labor-intensive commodity manufacturing (Muro et
al. 2015; Scott 2015).
Many of these trends pertaining to the relative success of advanced
manufacturing can be attributed to FDI. As previously discussed, the lion’s share of
FDI is spent on the manufacturing sector, accounting for an average of 39% of total
FDI between 1997 and 2010 (Payne and Yu 2011). Moreover, the majority of FDIsupported employment in manufacturing falls into advanced industry subsectors. In
2017, for example, the chemical industry received 44% of the total FDI directed at
manufacturing (Book 2018). One report from the US Department of Commerce that in
addition to providing consistently higher compensation than positions in U.S. firms,
FDI-supported employment has proven more stable than domestic-supported
employment (Payne and Yu 2011). Specifically, while total manufacturing
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employment fell 24% between 1998 and 2008, FDI-supported manufacturing
employment only fell by 11% (Payne and Yu 2011). These figures are attractive on the
surface. In theory, this might suggest that advanced manufacturing could be
globalization’s “answer” to the financially-struggling workers displaced by eroding
blue-collar industries. The reality, however, is that advanced industry, including FDIsupported employment, is in many ways deepening existing the political and economic
divisions brought by globalization.
Beyond its superficial promise of recovery for displaced former manufacturing
workers, several developments within the advanced industries have worsened their
circumstances. First, technology is widening the gap between employment and
productivity as robotics have increasingly rendered human involvement in
manufacturing obsolete (Muro 2016b; Stiglitz 2017). This is evidenced by the fact that
while total manufacturing output in the United States is at an all-time high, total
employment has plummeted in both traditional and advanced manufacturing (Scott
2015). Logically, the continuation of this trend does not bode well for the employment
prospects of the advanced industries’ unskilled faction, who risk joining the ranks of
“Used-to-Be’s” in the future. Second, the geographic clustering of AI jobs limits
economic opportunities for the most vulnerable to job loss. While conventional
wisdom on labor-market adjustment suggests that dislocated workers would simply
migrate to more economically-healthy areas to find new jobs, as they have historically
done during periods of recession, this no longer appears to be the case; instead, the
majority of dislocated workers default to nonparticipation in the labor force altogether
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(Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2016; Muro 2016a). This apparent inability to relocate
makes the uneven geography of gainful employment especially problematic.
At the root of globalization’s many tensions, including urban and rural; blue
and white collar; or high and low-output, is the shifting geography of opportunity with
respect to rural-urban migration and regional industrial specialization. Census reports
indicate that between 2000 and 2010, America’s urban population has increased by
12.1%, a rate that exceeds the overall national growth rate of 9.7% for the same period
(“Growth in Urban Population,” 2012). This phenomenon is reflected in the geography
of employment growth, which is becoming increasingly concentrated within
metropolitan areas (Hertz 2017). The FDI-induced geographic disparity is
compounded by the fact that the rural areas are experiencing zero or negative
population growth due to rural-urban migration, while the country’s overall declining
workforce participation due to its aging population amount to a locally-shrinking labor
force. The corresponding movement of jobs from rural to urban areas produces
disparate economic circumstances for less skilled or unskilled workers. One study
notes:
“Rural areas have larger concentrations of Machinists and Makers,
which generally require less skill and receive lower salaries. Jobs with the
highest skill requirements -- engineers, executives, scientists, and analysts -were noticeably underrepresented in rural areas and were far below national
averages” (Abel, Gabe, and Stolarick 2014.).
The “machinist” and “maker” categories encompass mostly the traditional
labor-intensive commodity manufacturing that is experiencing an overall decline in

Smoske 20
employment. In rural communities, these workers not only make less than the
“knowledge” workers of urban areas, but also less than their urban counterparts
employed in manufacturing subindustries (Abel, Gabe, and Stolarick 2014). In short,
the predominant impact of rural-urban migration is to dive away existing jobs and halt
job creation in rural communities in favor of urban areas, creating a deeper economic
divide between rural and urban Americans.
Though a faction of unskilled workers successfully acquire comparatively
higher-paying jobs in urban areas, their long-term economic stability is also vulnerable
due to increasing regional industrial specialization. As many researchers have
observed, many industries have a tendency to cluster geographically, because
industrial organization around resources, whether they be access to raw materials,
skilled workers, or local knowledge flows, optimizes the industry’s capacity for
innovation (Muro et al. 2015; Scott 2015; Feldman and Florida 1994). Advanced
manufacturing is no exception, as the United States has developed “a distinct advanced
industry geography” job growth occurs along lines of regional specialization (Muro et
al. 2015). In any region, increasing specialization is inherently limiting the range of
economic opportunity available to workers. While this phenomenon can certainly
impact the job-market prospects for skilled workers, it is especially economicallydestabilizing for unskilled workers who possess lesser means to relocate and a more
prohibitively-narrow skillset (Feldman and Florida 1994). Overall, an economic
landscape where many industries are not national, but local, economic outcomes for
different factions of the American population will greatly differ depending on the
industrial composition of their respective local economies. Over time, as the
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geography of opportunity has become increasingly favorable to the educated elite at
the expense of America’s “Used-to-Be’s,” deepening class stratification aggravates
political tensions between globalization’s “winners” and “losers.”
The forces of globalization in America have produced variable outcomes for
different factions of the population depending upon economic context. These
outcomes can be conceptualized as tensions that have surfaced in the American
political landscape: between urban and rural populations; blue and white collar
professions; or high and low-output counties, and others. The state of American
manufacturing is a particularly helpful example that can be used to explain the nature
and origin of these divisions. The aggregate impact of these divisions is the recent
proliferation of anti-globalization sentiment, or “alter-globalization” (Eriksen 2014).
This backlash against globalization, born from the anger of the recently economicallydisenfranchised, serves to explain why a populist leader like Trump proved an
attractive candidate and what Stiglitz calls “new protectionism” an appealing
redirection for American policy (Stiglitz 2017; Rodrik 2017). More broadly, these
varied outcomes explain the attitudes underlying an increasingly-polarized political
landscape. As Friedman notes, quite prophetically, in The Lexus and the Olive Tree,
“Used-to-Be’s are distinct from any other group spurned by globalization because they
possess the political clout to organize (Friedman 1999). This is precisely what is
occurring among those who have been ousted from a comfortable middle-class
lifestyle when their jobs became obsolete or moved elsewhere. As Stiglitz notes the
“newly-discontented” middle and working class people marginalized by globalization
are airing their frustrations at the ballot box (Stiglitz 2017).
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VI. Conclusion
In the United States, the popular debate often describes globalization as
yielding uniformly positive or negative effects. This line of reasoning is employed
particularly in discussion about globalization-induced shifts in the US labor market
and its implications on Americans’ economic prosperity. However, this conception of
globalization is not theoretically sound, as it lends itself to overly simplified
explanations for the current social, political, and economic divisions in the United
States. My analysis suggests, in contrast, that that the impact of globalization is
mediated by different economic contexts of American states. By examining the impact
of inward foreign direct investment on employment in Colorado, Georgia, Ohio, and
Texas , I demonstrate that the different economic contexts of each states mediates the
varied results globalization discernible in them.

My findings facilitate improved and more nuanced understanding of the deep
social, political, and economic divisions in the United States today. Because of
globalization, the American economy is becoming increasingly polarized, defined by
tensions between the “newly-discontented” – those economically displaced by the
decline of traditional blue-collar industry – and the educated, white-collar Americans
working in knowledge professions. This polarization is deepened by accelerating ruralurban migration, which creates a higher concentration of jobs in metropolitan areas
and widens the gap between “low-output” and “high-output America” (Muro 2016).
For unskilled workers in urban areas, employment is nonetheless becoming
increasingly inaccessible as the skills requirements for jobs are outpacing education
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and the technological strides in “advanced industry” drive unskilled workers in
obsolescence. These deep divisions were reflected in Donald Trump’s victory in 2016.

Finally, this thesis has not addressed other important topics related to
globalization, such as trade, capital flows, banking and finance, cyber technology, the
growth of knowledge-based productions hubs in different parts of the world, among
other issues. I intend to explore these topics in the future in graduate school.
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Figure 1. Conventional Popular Wisdom about Globalization Outcomes

Figure 2. Reformulation of the Conventional Popular Wisdom about
Globalization Outcomes

Figure 3. Alternative Theoretical Proposition
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Table 1. State Workforce by Economic Sectors in Colorado, Georgia, Ohio and
Texas

Economic Sectors
Finance and Insurance
Information
Other
Professional/Scientific
Real Estate
Retail
Total Manufacturing
Wholesale Trade
Totals

Colorado
Total Sector
% Sector
Employment Employment
104,700
3.86
69,390
2.56
1,803,147
66.40
202,090
7.44
33,070
1.22
262,810
9.68
138,960
5.12
101,600
3.74
2,715,767
100.00

Georgia
Total Sector
% Sector
Employment
Employment
162,090
3.60
111,840
2.48
2,857,449
63.44
259,320
5.76
42,890
0.95
482,150
10.70
375,030
8.33
213,460
4.74
4,504,229
100.00

Ohio
Total Sector
% Sector
Total Sector
Employment Employment
Employment
Finance and Insurance
212,060
3.92
493,170
Information
71,770
1.33
199,970
Other
3,338,030
61.63
8,198,366
Professional/Scientific
248,500
4.59
704,970
Real Estate
42,950
0.79
135,010
Retail
580,390
10.72
1,295,380
Total Manufacturing
686,660
12.68
893,540
Wholesale Trade
235,860
4.35
575,700
Totals
5,416,220
100.00
12,496,106
Source: Table created by author from sources described in the text.
Economic Sectors

Texas
% Sector
Employment
3.95
1.60
65.61
5.64
1.08
10.37
7.15
4.61
100.00
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Table 2. FDI Contribution to Employment by Economic Sectors in Colorado,
Georgia, Ohio, and Texas
COLORADO
Economic Sectors
Finance and Insurance
Information
Other
Professional/Scientific
Real Estate
Retail
Total Manufacturing
Wholesale Trade
Totals

Economic
Sectors
Finance and Insurance
Information
Other
Professional/Scientific
Real Estate
Retail
Total Manufacturing
Wholesale Trade
Totals

GEORGIA

Total Sector
Employment
104,700
69,390
1,803,147
202,090
33,070
262,810
138,960
101,600
2,715,767

Total FDI
Employment
7,800
8,800
34,800
7,500
300
5,300
29,000
9,500
103,000

% FDI
Employment
7.45
12.68
1.93
3.71
0.91
2.02
20.87
9.35
3.79

Total Sector
Employment
162,090
111,840
2,857,449
259,320
42,890
482,150
375,030
213,460
4,504,229

Total FDI
Employment
6,500
9,800
64,500
11,600
3,000
9,500
78,200
39,100
222,200

Total Sector
Employment
212,060
71,770
3,338,030
248,500
42,950

OHIO
Total FDI
% FDI
Employment Employment
5,100
2.40
6,000
8.36
57,500
1.72
11,400
4.59
700
1.63

Total Sector
Employment
493,170
199,970
8,198,366
704,970
135,010

TEXAS
Total FDI
% FDI
Employment Employment
26,200
5.31
25,900
12.95
212,300
2.59
46,600
6.61
6,300
4.67

580,390
686,660
235,860
5,416,220

17,900
412,300
15,700
526,600

3.08
60.04
6.66
9.72

1,295,380
893,540
575,700
12,496,106

Source: Table created by author from sources described in the text.

28,400
180,800
59,600
586,100

% FDI
Employment
4.01
8.76
2.26
4.47
6.99
1.97
20.85
18.32
4.93

2.19
20.23
10.35
64.91
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Appendix 1. State Workforce and FDI Employment Profile: Colorado
COLORADO
Total Sector
Employment

% Sector
Employment

Total FDI
Employment

% FDI
Employment

Finance and Insurance

104,700

3.86

7,800

7.45

Information

69,390

2.56

8,800

12.68

1,803,147

66.40

34,800

1.93

Professional/Scientific

202,090

7.44

7,500

3.71

Real Estate

33,070

1.22

300

0.91

Retail

262,810

9.68

5,300

2.02

Total Manufacturing

138,960

5.12

29,000

20.87

Wholesale Trade

101,600

3.74

9,500

9.35

2,715,767

100.00

103,000

3.79

Economic Sectors

Other

Totals

Source: Table created by author from sources described in the text.
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Appendix 1. State Workforce and FDI Employment Profile: Georgia
GEORGIA
Total Sector
Employment

% Sector
Employment

Total FDI
Employment

% FDI
Employment

Finance and Insurance

162,090

3.60

6,500

4.01

Information

111,840

2.48

9,800

8.76

2,857,449

63.44

64,500

2.26

Professional/Scientific

259,320

5.76

11,600

4.47

Real Estate

42,890

0.95

3,000

6.99

Retail

482,150

10.70

9,500

1.97

Total Manufacturing

375,030

8.33

78,200

20.85

Wholesale Trade

213,460

4.74

39,100

18.32

4,504,229

100.00

222,200

4.93

Economic Sectors

Other

Totals

Source: Table created by author from sources described in the text.
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Appendix 1. State Workforce and FDI Employment Profile: Ohio
OHIO
Total Sector
Employment

% Sector
Employment

Total FDI
Employment

% FDI
Employment

Finance and Insurance

212,060

3.92

5,100

2.40

Information

71,770

1.33

6,000

8.36

3,338,030

61.63

57,500

1.72

Professional/Scientific

248,500

4.59

11,400

4.59

Real Estate

42,950

0.79

700

1.63

Retail

580,390

10.72

17,900

3.08

Total Manufacturing

686,660

12.68

412,300

60.04

Wholesale Trade

235,860

4.35

15,700

6.66

5,416,220

100.00

526,600

9.72

Economic Sectors

Other

Totals

Source: Table created by author from sources described in the text.
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Appendix 1. State Workforce and FDI Employment Profile: Texas
TEXAS
Economic Sectors

Total Sector
Employment

% Sector
Employment

Total FDI
Employment

% FDI
Employmen
t

Finance and Insurance

493,170

3.95

26,200

5.31

Information

199,970

1.60

25,900

12.95

8,198,366

65.61

212,300

2.59

Professional/Scientific

704,970

5.64

46,600

6.61

Real Estate

135,010

1.08

6,300

4.67

1,295,380

10.37

28,400

2.19

Total Manufacturing

893,540

7.15

180,800

20.23

Wholesale Trade

575,700

4.61

59,600

10.35

12,496,106

100.00

586,100

64.91

Other

Retail

Totals

Source: Table created by author from sources described in the text.

